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Abstract—The emergence of New Data Sources (NDS) in
healthcare is revolutionising traditional electronic health records
in terms of data availability, storage, and access. Increasingly,
clinicians are using NDS to build a virtual holistic image of a
patients health condition. This research is focused on a review
and analysis of the current legislation and privacy rules available
for healthcare professionals. NDS in this project refers to and
includes patient-generated health data, consumer device data,
wearable health and fitness data, and data from social media.
This project reviewed legal and regulatory requirements for
New Zealand, Australia, the European Union, and the United
States to establish the ground reality of existing mechanisms
in place concerning the use of NDS. The outcome of our
research is to recommend changes and enhancements required
to better prepare for the ’tsunami’ of NDS and applications in
the currently evolving data-driven healthcare area and precision
or personalised health initiatives such as Precision Driven Health
(PDH) in New Zealand.
I. INTRODUCTION
New Data Sources (NDS) include health and medical-
related patient information from smart sensors, advanced de-
vices, social media, and genetic data. Aggregation of NDS in
an Electronic Health Record (EHR) might support and provide
precise and tailored healthcare outcomes. Although, gathering
of multiple data sources (including NDS) enables clinicians to
access and view detailed patient information at the point-of-
care for precise and informed decision making, it also raises
serious privacy concerns, in particular when a patient might not
be aware of who is accessing their health data. It is predicted
that a patient’s electronic health records in the near future will
have non-traditional health information (including NDS). An
initiative looking in to the future of healthcare is Precision
Driven Health (PDH)1 - a New Zealand healthcare research
partnership investing in the future of data-driven healthcare.
Current systems and processes require an effective way
of getting informed consent not only for EHRs but also for
the NDS. From a privacy point of view, there are two main
concerns. First, how to capture patients informed consent
1http://www.precisiondrivenhealth.com
for collecting NDS data. Second, how to obtain consent for
regulating access to this collected data. This is technically
known as access control. For example, a patient might want
to allow the General Practitioner (GP) access to the data, but
could decide not to provide access to any other healthcare
professionals. In both cases, the challenging part is to get and
manage consent in a flexible, usable, and transparent manner.
The main problem is that consent management for NDS is
fragile in nature, i.e., a patient can withdraw his/her consent to
provide access to the NDS at any time. This is different from
giving consent for providing access to an EHR that might be
necessary for diagnosing health issues. Unfortunately, current
healthcare systems are not capable of integrating NDS for
a number of reasons including technical issues, legal and
regulatory requirements, and usability aspects, where patients
should be kept in the loop but without too much intervention.
In [1], Powles and Hodson discuss the case of the data shar-
ing agreement between DeepMind and the Royal Free London
NHS Foundation Trust. They point out unlawful transfer of
patient data to third parties. The UK law requires “explicit
consent from a patient when identifiable data is passed to
a third party, when the third party is not in a direct care
relationship with the patient”. However, there was no process
of obtaining patient consent or giving notices to patients whose
data were used. There is also concern that the data being used
is broader than the original stated purpose of developing an app
for Acute Kidney Injury (AKI). There is also no justification
for the breadth of data transfer and the length of data retention.
The main issue is that DeepMind is not open for public audit
and scrutiny but rather is self-maintained by Google. This case
strongly advocates that there is a need to come up with a
transparent framework for obtaining and managing consent,
where patients are empowered to provide access to their health
information and view who is using their health information.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section II,
we cover legal and regulatory requirements concerning privacy
and consent in healthcare. In Section III, we review existing
research approaches for capturing and managing consent. In
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Section IV, we discuss opportunities and challenges. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
This research reviews legal and regulatory requirements of
countries that have an established electronic patient record
in legislation and regulations in healthcare privacy, namely
New Zealand (NZ), Australia (AU), the European Union (EU),
and the United States (US). We identify the differences and
similarities in legal requirements between these countries in
terms of consent and healthcare privacy.
In New Zealand, there is a Health Information Privacy Code
(HPIC) 1994 [2], which is based on the following rules:
• Rules 1-4: The purpose of collection must be speci-
fied while collecting patient consent. Patients must be
adequately informed about what information is being
collected and the collection of information must be done
in a lawful and fair manner.
• Rule 5: covers security and storage of health informa-
tion, where healthcare providers must ensure adequate
protection against misuse, loss, and unauthorised access.
• Rules 6-7: These rules state patient rights to request and
gain access to their health information and enable them
to request corrections.
• Rule 8: It ensures that healthcare providers must ensure
the information is up-to-date and relevant to the case.
• Rule 9: It explains retention of healthcare information,
where healthcare providers are required to retain infor-
mation for a minimum of 10 years.
• Rule 10: It requires the healthcare provider to only use
the information for the purposes stated unless permitted
by the patient, taken from a public source, or the infor-
mation has been de-identified.
• Rule 11: It limits healthcare providers from sharing infor-
mation. It explains circumstances under which healthcare
providers are allowed to disclose patient information,
such as when patients are unable to exercise their rights
or someone is acting on their behalf.
• Rule 12: It governs the use of unique identifiers assigned
to patients. These unique identifiers allow the patient to
be anonymous.
The regulations in Australia are unique, where each state
has their own set of laws and regulations concerning pri-
vacy [3]. We reviewed the New South Wales Health Records
and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW HRIPA) [4] as it
is the most recent legislation passed in Australia that relates
to health information privacy. The basic HRIPA principles are
similar to the NZ HPIC, which governs data collection, storage
and security, data access and accuracy, limitation of use and
data disclosure, and identifiers and anonymity.
Although the European Union legislation has no specific
clause that covers privacy of EHR, the Data Protection Di-
rective (DPD) 95/46/EC [5] is the legal EU framework that
protects personal information including the EHR. The core of
the data collection is that the data must be adequate, relevant
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they
are processed. The purpose of the data collection must also
be determined and further collection, if not specified in the
original purpose, is not allowed. Under Article 2(h) of the
DPD [5], consent is defined as “must be freely given, specific
and informed”.
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act) [6] governs with the US legislation for healthcare privacy
by defining rules to ensure that personal health information
that is stored by healthcare providers would not be disclosed
or used in a way that would violate patient privacy. HIPAA
covers all individually identifiable health information in any
form or media and this is called Protected Health Information
(ProHI) [6]. One of the central aspects of HIPAAs Privacy Act
is minimum necessary disclosure and access for the intended
purpose of the request. HIPAAs Privacy Act is one of the more
extensive laws that cover different entities requiring policy,
personnel, technical, administrative, and physical safeguards
to prevent unintended or intended disclosure of data unless
permitted or required. Individuals have general important
rights under HIPAA, which include the right to request a copy
of the ProHI that the covered entities hold, make amendments
to the record, permit or deny use of their ProHI, and also
an audit log of their ProHI disclosure. Individuals can also
request to restrict use or disclosure of their ProHI for reasons
of treatment, payment or healthcare; however, entities do not
need a patients consent to share information when it is used
for treatment, payment, or healthcare services.
Table I summarises healthcare legislation of countries in-
clued in this study. It is important to highlight that none of the
countries studied include a provision in legislation for NDS.
III. EXISTING RESEARCH APPROACHES
The core security service that all EHR systems try to offer is
Access Control for enabling access to only legitimate individu-
als, controlled and determined by the patient. To enable access
control in EHR databases, there are several proposals based
on the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model, described
in [7], [8]. RBAC models require a system administrator to
create roles based on job functions and to assign those roles
to individuals.
One of the problems with RBAC is handling of a team
in a multi-team environment, where roles might change and
are more dynamic, as is the case in healthcare scenarios
where different levels of access are required across a mul-
tidisciplinary team. In Singapore, an implied consent model is
implemented, giving any member of the health organisation
unrestricted access to a patient’s medical data. Audit logs
could deter unauthorised access but they are unavailable to
the patient. With regards to consent revocation, Singapore
assumes an implied consent model because “explicit consent
is practically difficult, especially under emergency circum-
stances” [9]. Although there is legislation that is supposed
to assure the protection of personal data, authorised personnel
are generalised, allowing access to one who is associated with
a healthcare provider.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION OF COUNTRIES STUDIED AND PRIVACY CONCERNS IN EHR
Legislation/
Concerns NZ HPIC 1994 AUS NSW HRIPA EU DPD US HIPAA
Data collection &
Patient rights
Rules 1-4 summarise purpose
and source, informing indi-
viduals of data use and how
data is collected.
Individuals must be informed
of the purpose and extent of
data collected.
Detailed information of how
data is being used must be
made available when identifi-
able information is used.
Obligation to inform patients how
information is disclosed and to
whom in privacy notices.
Referrals /data
sharing
Rules 10-12 limit the use and
disclosure of health informa-
tion to the stated purposes.
Unique identifiers must be
used to protect personal infor-
mation.
Health records can only be
used for the purposes stated to
the patient, any secondary use
must be requested unless it is
an emergency.
There are no specific rules bar-
ring or requesting patient con-
sent before sharing data, al-
though the purpose for each
collection must be stated ex-
plicitly.
Patient has to specifically request
to restrict EHR, but healthcare
provider has no obligation to
comply. No patient authorisation
needed to share data if it is in
regards to treatment.
Ability to
view/correct
EHR
Rules 6-8 state the need to
give patient rights to view
EHR and correct if neces-
sary, also data integrity and
retention. Health data must be
stored for 10 years
Patients can view their EHR
and request to delete, change,
or add data.
Patients are given rights to
view, erase, and correct their
EHR data.
Patients are given the right to
view and request for corrections
but healthcare providers do not
have to conform.
Data disclosure Rules 5 and 11 cover dis-
closure of confidential data
to authorised individuals only
and for consented purposes.
Disclosure of data is prohib-
ited outside of consented pur-
pose and authorised individ-
ual.
Authentication mechanisms,
electronic method of
identification and audit
logs are required.
Access safeguards and breach no-
tification specifications are ad-
dressed. Audit logs must be
stored for 6 years.
Other healthcare implementations, for example Summary
Care Record (SCR) in the United Kingdom (UK), use a smart
card based system. The card could only be used at terminals
with card readers and by users with a valid login ID and
password [10]. It is assumed a third party (i.e., Registration
Authority) assigns roles to users and controls the keys that are
assigned to the users [11].
Smart card based solutions have been proposed in the
literature. Neubauer and Heurix [12] proposed the use of
microcontroller smart cards that can store user credentials,
thus acting as a trusted platform. User data is encrypted in
the database with the keys that are stored on the card.
Lee and Lee [13] also proposed a solution to use keys
stored in the smart card, a patient-specific key, and also
digital signatures to authenticate parties while maintaining the
confidentiality of the data. Although such solutions manage
cryptographic keys nicely, they do not consider problems such
as losing the card or damage to the chip. These problems might
make the database inaccessible unless there is an off the band
backup of keys.
Hembroff and Muftic [14] used a system called SAMSON
(Secure Access for Medical Smart Cards Over Networks) that
uses smart cards and a combination of PIN and patient’s bio-
metric fingerprint to access the EHR. It considers emergency
features in which the patient is unable to give consent, by
giving physicians a special privilege to “break the glass” and
access the EHR. The main drawback of this approach is that
it assumes a patients smart card is present and would serve as
a base for the 3-factor authentication proposed.
Hu et al. [15] proposed a Hybrid Public Key Infrastructure
(HPKI) that uses smart cards given to users with their public
and private keys already assigned. There are individual level
certificates and organisational level certificates available to
healthcare providers. Such a solution would be interesting if
keys could be revoked (and new cards and keys could be
issued) in cases where the cards are damaged or lost.
There are extensions of public key cryptography to ensure
fine-grained access control, such as Key Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption (KP-ABE) proposed by Goyal et al. [16],
where encryption keys are distributed based on attributes
assigned. Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-
ABE) [17] tries to improve on KP-ABE, reducing the need to
trust the Trusted Authority (TA) to distribute the key correctly
by attribute. CP-ABE embeds policies into the ciphertext to
determine access. One of the problems that arises from KP-
ABE and CP-ABE is a lack of support for attribute revocation,
meaning there is no scalable solution to revoke revoked users
from accessing the existing data.
Wu et al. [18] propose a private key generator, which in this
case is a trusted third party i.e., a cloud infrastructure. The
proposed idea uses symmetric key cryptography for providing
fine-grained access control to specific data to a number of
users. However, this framework does not consider consent
revocation.
Zhang et al. [19] presented Consent Based Access Control
(CBAC). To enable access to an EHR, a consent token will be
sent to the server and then the data would be re-encrypted
with a new key and sent to the requester. Consent tokens
have a lifetime and can be revoked by sending a revocation
notification, where the server would store it in a Consent
Revocation List (CRL). However, the proposed system does
not discuss which piece of data could be shared or how
requesting parties could be authenticated.
Ma and Sartipi [20] proposed a framework for sharing
medical images from labs using OpenID and OAuth as
an authentication and authorisation agent. Patient consent is
stored offline in a repository and would later be captured and
executed by an agent. The authors defined a comprehensive e-
consent UML class diagram to model a privacy based access
control policy but it does not consider an automated way to
capture consent.
Weitzel et al. [21] analysed the feasibility of using REST,
OAuth, and OpenSocial to integrate social data into the EHR
in the form of a gadget. The author considers the possibility of
integrating a team-based environment as a social network de-
fined using OpenSocial. A defined protocol using REST could
use the gadget/dashboard to evaluate the patient condition and
next treatment.
Wuyts et al. [22] proposed a system that uses XACML
(eXtensible Access Control Markup Language), which is based
on XML, to define access control. The XACML authorisation
service is then integrated into a Cross Enterprise Document
Sharing (XDS) reference architecture. XACML enables fine-
grained access control using policies that are a defined set of
rules restricting access.
Bahga and Madisetti [23] proposed Cloud Health Infor-
mation Systems Technology Architecture (CHISTAR), which
supports OAuth to ensure that patients are able to give consent.
The database is encrypted with a master key and then a key
encrypting key is passed to the requester and rotated after a
certain number of transactions. CHISTAR uses RBAC, which
is controlled by an administrator to assign access policies and
user roles. CHISTAR also considers encrypting the data stored
on the server using AES-256 encryption.
Asghar and Russello [24] reported a consent policy where
a patient is able to communicate their permission to grant
access to their EHR. They propose a consent evaluator that
evaluates consent policies and returns the consent response to
the requester. They define two types of policies: open and
complex. Open policies are more general and divided into
two types, blacklist and whitelist. Complex policies specify
conditional expressions that must be satisfied. In this system,
both the data subject and the data controller can define the
access control policies.
The existing research on access control generally lacks an
ability to empower patients to decide who can gain access
to their EHR. In addition, existing systems do not consider
consent revocation as an important functionality to be included
in their models. Consent for NDS is also another key point that
is not considered. A solution to authenticate, authorise and
ensure that patients have control over their EHR and NDS
would be vital to ensuring the highest safety and transparency
can be achieved.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
A. Opportunities
Currently, there is a gap between the legislation and sys-
tems that have been implemented across the world. Privacy
requirements that are laid out in legislation would empower
patients by providing them control over their EHR. However,
in most of the electronic systems studied, emerging sources
are not mentioned and patients have no control or rights other
than the ability to request a copy to view and/or edit their
partial EHR information.
It is evident that better and timely treatments and medical
decisions could be achieved if information from multiple
data sources is available to the clinician at the point-of-care.
For instance, a GP can make better prescriptions if provided
with regional health information, such as viral infections or
other diseases. Using emerging data sources is also useful in
cases where clinicians treat patients who are given consent
to access a medical database. Harman [25] used Natural
Language Processing (NLP) to analyse and detect symptoms
of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, bipolar
disorder, and seasonal affective disorder by analysing Twitter
posts. In summary, the potential benefits of NDS for research
and exploiting them to determine the cause of a disease would
offer a breakthrough in the modern big data society.
B. Challenges
Some of the challenges identified, which require justifica-
tion/answers when trying to achieve transparency by incorpo-
rating NDS with EHRs, include:
• Adaptation of new systems with existing healthcare in-
frastructure. Existing healthcare infrastructure lacks the
ability to process and pass on context that could be used
to mine ’Big Data’. Current healthcare practice lacks a
system that is able to collect specific information that is
required and request it from the user in an easy way.
• Communication and exchange of information. This could
be the main challenge in the world of digital records,
where exchanging information across different platforms
is complex for various reasons, such as the difference of
standards and protocols. The existing information that is
already being stored at geographically dispersed locations
and across different organisations must be taken into
account and tight integration is required.
• Other stakeholders in healthcare. Our focus was to
review privacy only at the healthcare provider level and
we include limited healthcare professionals as user such
as GPs and hospital Doctors and Nurses. But in practice,
EHR could also be handled by other stakeholders, such
as insurance companies, wider healthcare professionals,
government organisations, and professional governing
bodies. How to incorporate the parties mentioned without
over burdening patients must be thoroughly investigated.
• Data use and storage. One of the major concerns in terms
of privacy is the storage and use of data. Considering
the importance of data, and keeping an accurate patient
history, the debate of who should be storing the data is
also of concern. Both New Zealand Health Information
Privacy Code 1994 [2] and Privacy Act 1993 [26] stress
that (an agency) “shall not keep information for longer
than is required for the purposes for which the informa-
tion may be lawfully used”. The principle mentions that
the information can only be used for a specified lawful
period of time; however, it does not mention who will
decide on this length of time and how to determine the
appropriate length. When including NDS data, which can
be private in nature, the data retention period is a concern
from a privacy point of view.
• Capturing Consent. In this project, we highlight the
importance of consent that should be captured in a
usable, flexible, and transparent manner, thus empow-
ering patients to have control over their data as well
as helping clinicians to make better decisions. Consent
must be simple and presented in a way such that patients
should be able to understand and respond appropriately. It
should be customisable and adaptable to suit the patients
privacy requirements and healthcare needs. Transparency
can help answer the questions who, where, what, when,
and why the data is collected and used. Usage should be
reported back to the patient (if the information is used
out-of-scope).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
New Zealands current EHR landscape is fragmented and
lacks a centralised collection of patient data and electronic
consent management processes and protocols. In order to
incorporate the emerging New Data Sources (NDS), one
challenge that should be tackled is how patient data can be
unified. As our study of processes and protocols highlighted,
NDS is not considered in the current legislation and access
control to health-related information is not always determined
by the patient. The main concern is that consent for NDS is
fragile in nature and current electronic systems are not capable
of handling consents over NDS appropriately. For instance, a
patient can freely deny access to their NDS, but healthcare
providers/professionals can still access a patient’s EHR due
to the lack of the inability to combine consent of EHR and
NDS into one. A dynamic consent is needed where patients
can freely approve or withdraw their consent at any time,
while staying informed of how their data is being used and by
whom.
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